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COMMENT
EXTENDING "INIMUM CONTACTS" TO ALIMONY:
MIZNER v. MIZNER
In 1877 the United States Supreme Court decided Pennoyer v.
Neff, which held that a court must have "power" over a defendant
in order to subject him to in personam jurisdiction.2 This doctrine
has proved too inherently inflexible to deal adequately with the
enormous number of interstate transactions in modern America.3 To
meet this problem, numerous exceptions to Pennoyer have been es-
tablished.4  One jurisdictional theory which has been employed to
this end is the doctrine of "minimum contacts." The essence of this
doctrine is that a state may assume in personam jurisdiction over a
defendant if he has "certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.'" "Minimum contacts" has been ap-
1 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2 Pennoyer lays down two propositions: "[E]very State possesses exclu-
sive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its terri-
tory." Id. at 722. "[N]o State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority
over persons or property without its territory." Id.
3 "[A] trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible
scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents.
In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national
economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or
more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent." McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.220, 222-23 (1957).
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFICT OF LAws § 27(1) (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft, Part I, 1967) states that: "A state has power to exercise judicial
jurisdiction over an individual on one or more of the following bases:
(a) presence;
(b) domicil;
(c) residence;
(d) nationality or citizenship;
(e) consent;
(f) appearance in an action;
(g) doing business in the state;
(h) an act done in the state;
(i) causing an effect in the state by an act done elsewhere;
(j) ownership, use or possession of a thing in the state;
(k) other relationships to the state which make the exercise of judicial
jursidiction reasonable."
The philosophy underlying this section is that "[a] state has power to exer-
cise judicial jurisdiction over a person if the person's relationship to the state
is such as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction reasonable." Id. § 24(1).
5 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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plied by the United States Supreme Court to foreign corporations
in cases involving state taxation,6 contracts7 and probate.8 Other
courts have extended it to cover tort cases as well.9
Is a further extension of "minimum contacts," to include ali-
mony and related areas in domestic -relations feasible? This is the
question to which this comment is addressed. Such an inquiry re-
quires the consideration of two independent problems: statutory
authority and constitutional power. Although both will be dealt
with, primary emphasis will be placed on the latter. The "spring-
board" for this analysis is Mizner v. Mizner,'0 in which the Nevada
Supreme Court did apply the "minimum contacts" concept in an ac-
tion to enforce a California alimony judgment.
Alimony: The Status Quo
After "decades of confusion,"" the effect of divorce decrees ac-
quired ex parte was finally determined in two United States Su-
preme Court decisions, both entitled Williams v. North Carolina:1
2
Full faith and credit must be accorded an ex parte divorce granted by
any state in which one spouse was, in fact,13 domiciled.
14
However, the rule of the two Williams cases has not been ex-
tended by the Court to alimony. In both Estin v. Estin'15 and Vander-
bilt v. Vanderbilt,6 state courts had awarded the plaintiff a decree of
absolute divorce, with no provision for alimony.17 In each case a
New York court refused to accord full faith and credit to the sister
state's denial of alimony. 8 Relying on the Williams cases, the United
6 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). See also Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
8 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
9 E.g., Wiederhorn v. The Sands, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959) (Traynor, C.J.);
Nelson v. Miller, 11 IIl. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); Gambs v. Morgenthaler,
83 Nev. 90, 423 P.2d 670 (1967).
10 - Nev. -, 439 P.2d 679 (1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3123 (U.S.
Oct. 15, 1968) (No. 334).
11 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 256 (1945) (Rutledge, 3.)
(dissenting opinion).
12 317 U.S. 287 (1942) [known as Williams v. North Carolina(I)]; 325
U.S. 226 (1945) [known as Williams v. North Carolina(II)].
13 The requirement that one spouse be a bona fide domiciliary of the
state in which the divorce was obtained was established in Williams v. North
Carolina(II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945). This point was not litigated in Williams
v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
14 Williams v. North Carolina(I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
15 334 U.S. 541 (1947).
16 354 U.S. 416 (1956).
17 See id. at 416-17; 334 U.S. 541, 543 (1947).
18 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E.2d 553, 153 N.Y.S.2d 1
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States Supreme Court found each divorce entitled to full faith and
credit.19 The respective denials of alimony, however, were held to
have been properly refused full faith and credit.20 This apparent
contradiction, known as "divisible divorce,"21 was explained in Es-
tin as being necessary to accommodate important conflicting interests
of law and policy.
22
Thus, with regard to alimony, there has been no advance beyond
Pennoyer. An alimony judgment is in personam.23  As such, the
court must have "power" over the defendant in order to have juris-
diction to grant the award. However, the Court has not decided any
case in which the state of the marital domicile, with the requisite
statutory authority,24 attempted to assert extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion over an out-of-state defendant.
25
Mizner v. Mizner
Mizner involved precisely that situation. Mr. and Mrs. Mizner
maintained their marital domicile in California from April, 1947
until March, 1965, when they separated, Mr. Mizner moving to Ne-
vada. Mrs. Mizner filed suit in California for divorce and alimony.
Pursuant to the California "long-arm statute,"26 personal service of
summons was made upon the defendant at his residence in Reno,
Nevada. He did not appear. Mrs. Mizner was awarded an interlocu-
tory decree of divorce and a judgment for $300 per month alimony.27
(1956); Estin v. Estin, 296 N.Y. 308, 73 N.E.2d 113, 70 N.Y.S.2d (unpaginated)
(1947).
1) Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 419 (1956); Estin v. Estin, 334
U.S. 541, 544-45 (1947).
20 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 419 (1956); Estin v. Estin, 334"
U.S. 541, 547-48 (1947).
21 As it was christened by the Court: "The result in this situation is to
make the divorce divisible-to give effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it
affects marital status and to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony."
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (emphasis added).
22 The Court explained that changes in marital status, such as divorce,
should be given full faith and credit whenever possible to avoid bigamous
marriages and illegitimate children. There being no such considerations
involved with respect to alimony, it should be fully litigated. Id. at 546-47.
23 De la Montanya v. De la Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 P. 345 (1896);
Glaston v. Glaston, 69 Cal. App. 2d 787, 160 P.2d 45 (1945).
24 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1952) (a child custody case), cited as
controlling by Justice Batjer, dissenting in Mizner v. Mizner, - Nev. -, -,
439 P.2d 679, 684 (1968), is not on point. The forum state in May was the
state of the marital domicile. However, it attempted to assert personal juris-
diction over the nonresident defendant without statutory authority. May v.
Anderson, supra at 530-31. Therefore, the constitutional question was not
reached. See text accompanying notes 42-43, and note 43 infra.
25 In Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1956) and Estin v. Estin, 334
U.S. 541 (1947), the forum state was not the state of the marital domicile.
See text accompanying notes 118-119 infra.
26 See text accompanying notes 44-46 infra.
27 Mizner v. Mizner, No. 101,297 (Super. Ct. Cal., filed Dec. 6, 1966).
Mrs. Mizner brought suit in Nevada to enforce the California
alimony judgment, asserting that it was entitled to full faith and
credit in the Nevada court. Her motion for summary judgment as
to that issue was granted28 and the husband appealed. His attack
was directed solely at the validity of that part of the original decree
which awarded alimony. He contended that the assumption of juris-
diction by the California court was a denial of due process in viola-
tion of the 14th amendment.2 9
In a 3-2 decision, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the lower
court decision granting Mrs. Mizner summary judgment had been
correct;30 i.e., that the California judgment was entitled to full
faith and credit in Nevada. The opinion relied upon the cases de-
lineating the "minimum contacts" concept of personal jurisdiction
over out-of-state defendants: International Shoe Co. v. Washington,31
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,3 2 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min-
ing Co.,33 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,34 and Hanson v. Den-
ckla.35
The court recognized that none of the cited cases involved a per-
sonal judgment for alimony,3 6 but noted that the doctrine of "mini-
mum contacts" is "peculiarly suited to matrimonial support cases. '37
It observed that the resulting extension of in personam jurisdiction
would help to solve some of the hardships arising from family sep-
aration.38 Particularly, it would rend the shield of "migratory di-
vorce" used by spouses to avoid their financial responsibilities.39 The
deep interest of the state in preventing the impoverishment of its
citizens would thereby be effectuated.40
Chief Justice Thompson, writing for the court in Mizner, con-
cluded that in personam jurisdiction may be acquired over a non-
resident defendant in an alimony action by extraterritorial personal
service of process if:
(1) a statute of the support-ordering state has authorized the ac-
quisition of such jurisdiction in that manner, and
(2) there exist sufficient contacts between the defendant and the
forum relevant to the cause of action to satisfy "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."4 1
28 See Mizner v. Mizner, - Nev. -, -, 439 P.2d 679, 680 (1968).
29 Id.
30 Id. at -, 439 P.2d at 681.
31 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
32 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
33 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
34 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
35 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
36 Mizner v. Mizner, - Nev. -, -, 439 P.2d 679, 680 (1968).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at -, 439 P.2d at 681.
41 Id.
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Thus, Mizner represents a step beyond the status quo in alimony. It
transcends the "power" doctrine of Pennoyer by applying the more
flexible standard of "minimum contacts."
Statutory Authority
The first question presented by Mizner is: Does the court of the
support-ordering state have the statutory authority to decide the
case? The answer turns on legislative action. If the "lqng-arm stat-
ute" of the forum state encompasses extraterritorial service in ac-
tions for alimony there is the requisite "statutory authority." With-
out it, the court lacks competence, and any judgment it renders is
void.42 The existence of statutory authority is therefore a condition
precedent to the consideration of the constitutional question.
4 3
In Mizner, the state whose statutory authority was involved was
California, whose "long-arm statute" consists of Code of Civil Pro-
cedure sections 412, 413 and 417. Section 412 provides that "[w] here
the person on whom service is made resides out of the state [and]
* . .a cause of action exists against the defendant. . . [the] court, or
judge, may make an order that the service be made by publication of
the summons. '44  Section 413 says that "[w]hen publication is or-
dered, personal service of a copy of the summons and complaint out
of the state is equivalent to publication. . . -45 And section 417
provides that "[w]here jurisdiction is acquired over a person who is
outside of this State by publication of summons in accordance with
Sections 412 and 413, the court shall have the power to render a per'
sonal judgment against such person only if he was personally served
with a copy of the summons and complaint, and was a resident
of this State . . . (b) at the time that the cause of action arose. '46
(Emphasis added).
There seems to have been no dispute that the defendant, Mr.
Mizner, resided out of the state, that a cause of action existed against
him, that he was personally served in Nevada, and that he was a
domiciliary of California at the time the cause of action arose.47
Since "resident," as used in California Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 417, has been judicially determined to mean "domiciliary," 48
42 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 7, comment a (1942).
43 "There are two parts to the question whether a foreign corporation can
be subject to suit within a state. The first is a question of state law: has the
state provided for bringing the foreign corporation into its courts under the
circumstances of the case presented .... If the state has purported to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the foreign corporation, then the question may arise
whether such attempt violates the due process clause." Pulson v. American
Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir. 1948) (Goodrich, J.).
44 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 412.
45 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 413.
46 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 417.
47 See Mizner v. Mizner, - Nev. -- -- 439 P.2d 679, 680-81 (1968)..
48 Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal. 2d 235, 288 P.2d 497 (1955).
there were no grounds on which to argue that the California court
lacked the statutory authority to decide the case.
Constitutional Power
The second question presented by Mizner is: Does the court of
the support-ordering state have the constitutional power to decide
the case? In order to ascertain if the doctrine of "minimum con-
tacts" may, consistently with due process, be applied to alimony, three
essential questions must be answered. First, are the contacts in
Mizner, as judged by the standards presented in International Shoe
et al., sufficient to be considered "minimum contacts?" Second,
have the cases been limited so as to preclude the application of the
"minimum contacts" test in alimony proceedings? Third, do these
proceedings present jurisdictional problems so unusual that jurisdic-
tional standards unique to them are necessary?
Minimum Contacts
The United States Supreme Court has decided five cases dealing
with "minimum contacts. '4 9 At issue in each was whether the sub-
jection of a nonresident defendant to personal jurisdiction by the
forum state was a denial of due process. In none of the five has
the Court spelled out a precise test for the "minimum contacts"
concept.50 An analysis of these cases, however, reveals an adequate
set of general guidelines.
Before the "minimum contacts" test can even be applied, the de-
fendant must conduct some activities within the forum state.51 To
be amenable to suit there, "it is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities with the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws. '52 This is in the nature of a
condition precedent.53
The determination of the existence (or nonexistence) of "mini-
49 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S.
437 (1952); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a good discussion, at
length, of these cases, see Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process
Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to
Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cmi. L. REv. 569, 586-624 (1958).
50 A flexible test, aimed at a balancing of interests, is suggested by Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
51 In International Shoe, the Court asserts that the due process clause
"does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no con-
tacts, ties or relations." Id.
52 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
53 See Comment, Extraterritorial In Personam Jurisdiction: The Sub-
stantive Due Process Requirement, 13 KYx. L. REv. 554, 561-62 (1965).
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mum contacts" is the process by which a court decides if the defend-
ant has carried on sufficient activities within the state to be sued
there.54  This process is not mechanistic. 55  Instead, it is flexible,
being, in truth, aimed at attaining "fair play and substantial jus-
tice."-5 6 In the five cases, the Court considered the following factors
to be of importance in determining whether sufficient contacts
existed (listed according to importance, in the author's opinion):
(1) Whether the activities of the defendant within the state were
systematic and continuous.57
(2) The state's interest in protecting its citizens with respect to the
type of action involved.58
(3) Whether the cause of action sued upon is related to the activities
carried on within the state.5 9
(4) The nature and quality of the defendant's act(s) when (a) the
activities were continuous but the cause of action was unrelated
to them;60 or (b) there was one, or only an occasional act within
the state.61
(5) The convenience of trying the case in the forum state.62
(6) The inconvenience to the defendant of defending the action away
from home.63
(7) The expense and trouble to the plaintiff of going to the defend-
ant's state to sue.64
(8) The problems involved in the plaintiff's adopting a different,
though available, method of pursuing his remedy.65
Thus, in applying the "minimum contacts" concept to the facts of
the case, the court in Mizner was faced with seeking answers to two
jurisdictional questions. First, did the defendant do "some act" within
the forum state which is the condition precedent for the applica-
tion of the "minimum contacts" test? This must be answered in the
affirmative. Mr. Mizner established a domicile in California and
54 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 316.
57 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
58 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643, 649 (1950).
59 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952); Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
60 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952); Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
61 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
62 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950).
63 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
64 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950).
65 Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950).
maintained it for some eight years.66 Second, as judged by the
criteria enumerated above, were the defendant's activities within
the forum state sufficient to be considered "minimum contacts?" This
question can be answered by considering the factual contacts in
Mizner within the guidelines presented by the standards previously
given. Analysis shows several factors in favor of upholding Califor-
nia's assumption of jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendant, and
only one opposed to it.
The defendant's activities within the state were both continuous
and systematic, thus meeting the most important criteria for find-
ing sufficient "minimum contacts." The primary meaning of domicile
is "home," 67 as that term is understood by a layman.68 It cannot be
doubted, as a general proposition, that the activities resulting from
the maintenance of a permanent home are continuous and systematic,
although there are situations in which a person will have very few
contacts with the state of his marital domicile.69 However, Mizner did
not present such a situation.70
The maintenance of the marital domicile in California also gave
that state a strong interest in the proceedings. 71 In cases such as
Mizner, the potential impoverishment of the plaintiff is often at stake.
A state has a clear interest in protecting its citizens against such an
occurrence. Also, it seems clear that the cause of action for alimony
arose out of activities within the state, since alimony is considered
compensation for the loss resulting from the defendant's breach of
the obligations of the marital relationship. 72 Further, California was
66 Mizner v. Mizner, - Nev. -, -, 439 P.2d 679, 679-80 (1968).
67 H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 17 (4th ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (Proposed Official Draft, pt. I, 1967).
68 In re Glassford's Estate, 114 Cal. App. 2d 181, 186, 249 P.2d 908, 911
(1952).
69 See note 80 infra.
70, There is nothing in the Mizner cases to indicate that the defendant had
had substantial activities in any state other than California. Further, in Miz-
ner v. Mizner, No. 101,297 (Super. Ct. Cal., filed Dec. 6,, 1966), it was found
that among the community property assets in California were a parcel of im-
proved real property, household furniture, furnishings, appliances and effects,
and a bank account. These assets substantiate the fact that the Mizners main-
tained a "home" in California.
71 This factor received primary emphasis in Mizner. Mizner v. Mizner,
- Nev. -, -, 439 P.2d 679, 680-81 (1968). Such emphasis seems appropriate,
since "state interest" has been accorded great weight in recent decisions. See,
e.g., Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959). See also
Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 346 U.S. 338 (1953).
... Professor Ehrenzweig suggests that the importance of McGee is that the
Court adopted an approach broader than that of International Shoe by relying
almost exclusively upon the factor of "state interest." Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer
is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 280, 288 (1958).
72 Hall v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 377, 289 P.2d 431 (1955); Cardew v.
Cardew, 192 Cal. App. 2d 502, 13 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1961); Whitney v. Whitney,
164 Cal. App. 2d 577, 330 P.2d 947 (1958).
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the most convenient place to try the case, since the corroborating
witness,73 required by law in California for alimony to be granted,7 4
and Mrs. Mizner were both living in California at the time of the
suit.7
5
The sole factor which tended to mitigate against California assum-
ing personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant was the in-
convenience to him in having to defend the action away from his
home.70 This may not be very important when the defendant is a
corporation, 77 but might be accorded substantial weight when an in-
dividual is involved. 78 But even assuming this factor would receive
substantial weight, it should not be sufficient, by itself, to outweigh
the factors in favor of California's assumption of jurisdiction.
It should be noted that the analytical turning point in Mizner is
that the defendant had maintained his marital domicile in the forum
state. Because his contacts with that state were those of a marital
domiciliary, analysis showed that four important factors of the "min-
imum contacts" test balanced in favor of California's assuming juris-
diction.70 It seems safe to assume that Mizner represents a fairly typi-
cal case; that a marital domiciliary generally will have approxi-
mately the same contacts with his domicile as did the defendant in
Mizner. Therefore, whenever one state is both the marital domicile
and the forum, analysis almost always will demonstrate sufficient
"minimum contacts" to allow the assumption of jurisdiction by that
state. There might be exceptions, but they would be unusual.80
73 In both McGee and Travelers Health it was the presence of the neces-
sary witness in the forum state which made it the most convenient state in
which to try the case. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950).
74 Alimony is awarded with a divorce. CAL. CIV. CODE § 139. A corrobo-
rating witness is required to substantiate the proffered testimony. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 130 (quoted at note 97 infra).
75 The corroborating witness in Mizner was the couple's married daughter,
Gwenn Lee McGrew. At the time of the divorce action, Mrs. McGrew was
living at 202 Hazel Drive, Pleasant Hills, California. Mrs. Mizner was living
with her. Letter from James R. Holmstrom to the Hastings Law Journal,
Sept. 10, 1968, on file in Hastings Law Library.
76 In the author's opinion, the other factors set out in the five Supreme
Court cases are not relevant to the case at hand.
77 In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1945), the
inconvenience to a Texas corporation in defending a suit in California was
cursorily brushed aside, despite the fact that it had had no contacts with the
state save the single contract upon which suit was brought.
78 See generally Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30
RocxY MT. L. REv. 285, 292 (1958).
79 See note 116 infra.
80 Domicile is defined as physical presence in a state with an intent to
make a home there, "for the time at least." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CON-
FLCT OF LAWS §§ 15, 16, 18 (Proposed Official Draft, pt. I, 1967). Once
domicile is acquired, it is retained until a new one is established. Id. § 19.
A couple might thus be away from the marital domicile indefinitely and still
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Corporations Only?
It does not appear that the concept of "minimum contacts" has
in any way been directly limited to preclude its application to alimony.
However, the five United States Supreme Court cases have in com-
mon the significant fact that the party over whom extraterritorial in
personam jurisdiction was sought was a corporation.81 Thus, a ques-
tion which must be answered is: Is the concept of "minimum con-
tacts" limited, by implication, to corporate defendants?
Of the three basic policy statements in International Shoe, one
remain domiciliaries, provided that they do not intend to make a home in
any other place. An extreme example is that a person who travels about in a
mobile home does not, during his travels, acquire a new domicile. Id. § 16,
comment c.
A more normal example might run as follows: H and W have their mari-
tal domicile in state A. They travel extensively, having little contact with
state A. Eventually they part; H going to state B, W to state C. W. brings suit
in state A for divorce and alimony. It is submitted that state A could not enter
a personal judgment for alimony against H. The establishment of the marital
domicile in state A would be sufficient to allow the "minimum contacts" test
to be applied. However, the defendant's activities in state A could not be con-
sidered "continuous and systematic." Also, state A would have no interest in
the outcome of the proceedings since W has ceased to be a citizen of that state.
Further, depending upon the particular facts, it is probable that the cause of
action would not have arisen out of the activities within the state, and that
the necessary corroborating witness would not live there.
This submission is given some support by Owens v. Superior Court, 52
Cal. 2d 822, 829, 345 P.2d 921, 924 (1959) (Traynor, C.J.) (dictum). "If, for
example, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant were presently domiciled
here and the cause of action arose out of the defendant's activities elsewhere,
the fact standing alone that the defendant was domiciled here at the time the
cause of action arose might be too tenuous a basis for asserting jurisdiction
over him."
Compare the author's preceding hypothetical situation with the following:
H and W have their marital domicile in state A where they spend all of their
time. They separate; H going to state B, W to state C. W brings an action for
divorce in state A. The "minimum contacts test would clearly be applicable.
Also, the defendant's actions would be considered "continuous and syste-
matic". However, since W has ceased to be a citizen of state A, "state interest"
would not favor that state's assuming jurisdiction. But, if the cause of action
arose out of the activities within the state, state A probably would be able to
assume in personam jurisdiction over H. The existence of sufficient "mini-
mum contacts" has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation
there [in the forum state] have not only been continuous and systematic, but
also give rise to the liabilities sued on ... " International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
81 The corporations were, with the exception of Hanson v. Denckla, those
named in the case name, i.e., the International Shoe Co., the Travelers Health
Ass'n (an unincorporated association), the Benguet Consol. Mining Co., and
the International Life Ins. Co. In Hanson, the corporation involved was the
Wilmington Trust Co.
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refers only to "corporation,182 the second to "defendant,"8 3 and the
third at one point to "corporation," and at another to "an individual
or corporate defendant."8 4 Thus, the case is not decisive in deter-
mining if "minimum contacts" applies to defendants who are in-
dividuals. However, in McGee,8 5 Mr. Justice Black, writing for a
unanimous court, gave an overview of the cases from Pennoyer
through International Shoe:
Since Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, this court has held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places some limit on
the power of state courts to enter binding judgments against persons
not served with process within their boundaries. But just where this
line of limitation falls has been the subject of prolific controversy,
particularly with respect to foreign corporations.... Looking back
over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible to-
ward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over for-
eign corporations and other nonresidents.8 6
Although dictum, this statement appears decisive on the issue, since
its very terms, specifically envisage reaching nonresident defendants
who are individuals. While the greater part of the litigation has in-
volved nonresident corporations, on the strength of McGee "minimum
contacts" is applicable to individuals as well. This rationale has been
accepted by several appellate court decisions,8 7 including Calagaz v.
Calhoon8s and Owens v. Superior Court.8 9
82 "But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws
of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and,
so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a
suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly said to be undue."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (emphasis
added).
83 "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"
Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
84 "It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line be-
tween those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and
those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative .... Whether
due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature to the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which
it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause does not
contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties,
or relations." Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
85 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
86 Id. at 222 (dictum) (emphasis added).
87 E.g., Schutt v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 229 F.2d 158,
159 (2d Cir. 1956) (dictum) (Medina, J.).
88 309 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1962). The court was required to "decide if the
'minimum contacts' test enunciated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington
... applies to natural persons as well as to corporations." Id. at 254. It con-
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Thus, the fact that the defendant in Mizner was an individual,
rather than a corporation, does not render the "minimum contacts"
concept less applicable to him. It should be applied to individuals
whenever "fair play and substantial justice" so dictate 0
Continuing Jurisdiction
With respect to finality, alimony judgments are distinct from
judgments entered in tort or contract actions. In the latter, there is a
final judgment which ends the case.91 In the former, however, the
trial court retains continuing jurisdiction to modify the amount of
the award.92 Thus, the defendant conceivably faces a lifetime of liti-
gation.9 3 This distinction Justice Collins, dissenting in Mizner, finds
sufficient to require a "different substantive due process require-
ment."
94
Whether such a conclusion is warranted may be ascertained by
examining the protections afforded the interests of a nonappearing
defendant. The steps leading from the bringing of the original action
cluded that the "broad language of the opinion [in International Shoe] indi-
cates that it does." Id. The opinion went on to say that "it would seem that
the same considerations of fairness and the nature of the defendant's activities
in the state which are utilized in determining jurisdiction over corporations
would be equally applicable when the defendant is a natural person." Id. at
225.
89 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959). Chief Justice Traynor, writing for
the California Supreme Court, stated that "[t] he rationale of the International
Shoe case is not limited to foreign corporations, and both its language and the
cases sustaining jurisdiction over nonresident motorists make clear that the
minimum contacts test for jurisdiction applies to individuals as well as to
foreign corporations." Id. at 831, 345 P.2d at 924-25.
90 But cf., Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead- Long Live Pennoyer, 30
RocKY MT. L. REV. 285, 292 (1958) where it is suggested that the fact that a
corporation necessarily will have transacted business within the forum, while
an individual's contacts may be of a more varied nature, necessitates different
approaches for the two with regard to "minimum contacts." Professor Ehrenz-
weig concludes that "absent individuals not transacting business in the state
will have to remain exempt from jurisdiction with specific exceptions to be
established from case to case." Id.
91 Mizner v. Mizner, - Nev. -- -- 439 P.2d 679, 683 (1968) (Collins, J.)
(dissenting opinion).
92 CAL. CIV. CODE § 139.
93 In his dissenting opinion in Mizner, Justice Collins also suggests that
the defendant's estate might be bound after his death. Mizner v. Mizner, -
Nev. -, -, 439 P.2d 679, 683 (1968). In view of the provision in California
Civil Code section 139 that "[e]xcept as otherwise agreed by the parties in
writing, the obligation of any party . . . shall terminate upon the death of
the obligor," this suggestion must be regarded as unfounded.
94 Mizner v. Mizner, - Nev. -, -, 439 P.2d 679, 683 (1968). Justice Bat-
jer, in a separate dissenting opinion, makes the same point. Id. at - 439 P.2d
at 686.
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to a modification are three in number: (1) a divorce is granted,
(2) an alimony judgment is awarded with the divorce, (3) the ali-
mony judgment is modified as to amount. As will be seen, the rights
of a nonappearing defendant are afforded some protection at each
juncture. Although the discussion which follows refers only to Cal-
ifornia, similar protections exist in other states.9 5
Alimony is awarded in conjunction with a decree of divorce.9 6
Since the plaintiff spouse must offer proof of the facts alleged in order
to obtain the divorce,9 7 the defendant is given some modicum of pro-
tection. This, however, tends to be illusory in that courts generally
grant divorces summarily.9 s
However, in the determination of the amount of the alimony
award, the interests of the nonappearing spouse receive substantial
actual protection. The plaintiff spouse is entitled to alimony suffi-
cient to supply her needs, 99 or, if possible, to maintain her normal
standard of living.10 0 However, the uppermost limit of the award is
the defendant's ability to pay.10 1 These elements must be alleged
and proved by the plaintiff.0 2 An award which improperly balances
these elements amounts to an abuse of discretion. 0 3 These limita-
tions give the nonappearing defendant considerable protection against
an unreasonable initial award.
To this point, there is little difference between uncontested ali-
95 See H. CLARK, DoivNsmc RELATIoNs § 13.7, at 395-96; § 13.7, at 399-402;
§ 14.5, at 442-45; § 14.9, at 456 & n.34; § 14.9, at 459-61 (1968). [hereinafter
cited as CLARK]. Section 13.7 at 395-96 is concerned with the protections of-
fered the interests of the nonappearing defendant when divorce is granted.
Section 13.7 at 399-402 specifically treats corroboration. Section 14.5 at 442-45
deals with the factors involved in determining the amount of the alimony
award. Section 14.9 at 456 & n.34 indicates that it is a universal rule that a
change of circumstances is required for modification. Section 14.9 at 459-61
treats the factors allowing modification of the award as to increase.
9 CA. CIv. CODE § 139.
07 "No divorce can be granted upon the default of the defendant or upon
the uncorroborated statement, admission, or testimony of the parties . . . but
the court must... require proof of the facts alleged." CAL. CIv. CODE § 130.
In Zwarenstyn v. Zwarenstyn, 347 Mich. 353, 79 N.W.2d 913 (1956), where
there was no testimony offered to prove the facts alleged and divorce was
nevertheless granted, the case was reversed and remanded on appeal. The
Michigan statute, M.C.L. § 522.40 (1948) is (and was in 1956) the same, in
substance, as California Civil Code section 130.
98 See CLARK § 13.7 at 395-96. See also H. O'GoaMAN, LAWYERs AND
MATRioNViAL CAsES 21 (1963).
99 Bowman v. Bowman, 29 Cal. 2d 808, 811, 178 P.2d 751, 753 (1947).
100 See, e.g., Dallman v. Dallman, 170 Cal. App. 2d 729, 737, 339 P.2d 636,
641 (1959); Baldwin v. Baldwin, 28 Cal. 2d 406, 412, 170 P.2d 670, 674 (1946).
103 CLARK § 14.5, at 443. See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 42 Cal. 2d 435, 442, 276
P.2d 249, 253 (1954); Bowman v. Bowman, 29 Cal. 2d 808, 811, 178 P.2d 751,
753 (1947).
102 DaUman v. Dallman, 170 Cal. App. 2d 729, 737, 339 P.2d 636, 641 (1959).
103 Hall v. Hall, 42 Cal. 2d 435, 276 P.2d 249 (1954).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
mony judgments and those awarded in tort or contract actions in
which the defendant does not appear. In each the plaintiff has
brought an action and received a judgment. It is the possibility of
modification that sets the alimony judgment apart. It is in subse-
quent actions for modification that the defendant's interests are af-
forded the greatest protection. The essential requisite for modifica-
tion is a change of circumstances since the original order'0 4 suffi-
cient to warrant an alteration.105 Modifications granting an increase
generally have been, allowed only in two situations: 06 (1) where
the obligor's ability to pay has increased 07 and, (2) where the obligee
has incurred significant medical expenses subsequent to the judg-
ment.108 A further protection to the defendant is that he must be
given notice of the proposed modification. 0 9 Given the limited
grounds for modification, the necessity for a showing of a change of
circumstances, and the notice given to the obligor, the threat to his
interests is not too drastic.
Furthermore, modification is also available to the obligor.110 A
state is required only to give foreign judgments "the same full faith
and credit ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State
* . . from which they are taken.""' Therefore, whatever the Califor-
nia courts can do in modifying the decree, the Nevada courts, or those
of any other state, can also do." 2 Thus, the obligor may seek modifi-
cation in the courts of whatever state he is a resident.
Because the trial court retains continuing jurisdiction to modify
the original alimony judgment, the argument against applying "mini-
mum contacts" to alimony proceedings has considerable validity.
However, as has been pointed out, the threat to the nonappearing
defendant's interests is less formidable than it appears. In the last
analysis, a question of basic policy is presented. Are the burdens
placed upon the absent spouse sufficiently weighty that "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice""83 require that he be able
104 Bratnober v. Bratnober, 48 Cal. 2d 259, 261, 309 P.2d 441, 442-43 (1957).
IO5 Whether a particular 'change of circumstances is "sufficient" rests
largely in the discretion of the trial court. Id. at 262, 309 P.2d at 443.
106 Cf. J. GODDARD, DoMEsTic RELATIONS PRACTICE § 421 (4 CAIFONIA
PRAcTIcE monograph 1965).
107 E.g., Straub v. Straub, 213 Cal. App. 2d 792, 29 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1963).
108 E.g., McCarthy v. McCarthy, 216 Cal. App. 2d 872, 31 Cal. Rptr. 428
(1963); Schraier v. Schraier, 163 Cal. App. 2d 587, 329 P.2d 544 (1958).
109 CAL. Civ. CODE § 147. This may be a constitutional requirement under
the due process clause. See Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 231 (1945).
110 See Anderson v. Anderson, 129 Cal. App. 2d 403, 408, 276 P.2d 862, 866
(1954).
11 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964).
112 New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 614 (1946).
113 In fact, these would tend to dictate that the husband would be amen-
able to suit. Traditionally, a husband has been considered to be under a duty
to support his wife. Manby v. Scott, 86 Eng. Rep. 781 (K.B. 1659); 1 BLAcK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *442; F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF THE ENG-
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to abdicate his responsibilities to his wife and children? 114 It would
not seem so.
State Other Than the Marital Domicile
Consideration must be given to the possibility that a state other
than that of the marital domicile might attempt to assert personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant using the rationale of
Mizner. Most often, the "minimum contacts" test could not even
be employed. In a state other than the marital domicile, the de-
fendant spouse generally would not have conducted the activities
which operate as a condition precedent to the application of the
test." 5 Even if the test could be employed, for example where the
couple had maintained a residence in the forum state, there generally
would not be sufficient contacts. This is so because sufficient "mini-
mum contacts" exist by the force of the fact that the forum state is
also the state of the marital domicile.11 6 It seems that, as a general
rule," 7 no state other than that of the marital domicile could consti-
tutionally employ "minimum contacts" to obtain personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant to award alimony.
LISH LAw 405 (1898). This duty is recognized by statute in California. CAL.
Civ. CODE § 242.
There was no common law duty for a father to support his child. 1 BLACK-
sTONE, CO1wIENTAEIES *448. However, it has been acknowledged that a father
owes his children a certain amount of fair play. See Yarborough v. Yarbor-
ough, 290 U.S. 202, 220-22 (1933) (Stone, J.) (dissenting opinion). That a
father is primarily liable for the support of his children is recognized by stat-
ute in California. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 196, 242.
114 The author submits that the holding in Mizner is applicable equally
with regard to child support. See text accompanying notes 124-127 infra.
115 See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
116 The defendant's actions in Mizner were "systematic and continuous"
because they were associated with having a home. See text accompanying
notes 67-70 supra. The "state interest" factor came into play in Mizner be-
cause the plaintiff was a domiciliary of the forum state. See text accompany-
ing note 71 supra. The cause of action arose out of the activities within
the state because they were those of a domiciliary. See text accompanying
note 72 supra. California was the most convenient state in which to try
the case because the corroborating witness was there. See text accompanying
notes 73-75 supra. In addition, witnesses to activities will generally be found
where those activities take place, i.e., where the home is.
"I7 A situation in which the general rule might not be applied runs as fol-
lows: H and W are domiciled in state A. They have a residence in state B,
where they spend a significant amount of time. The couple separates, W mov-
ing permanently to state B. She brings an action in state B for divorce and
alimony.
The "minimum contacts" test is clearly applicable. However, on its appli-
cation, the facts present a very close case. H's activities in state B seem more
sporadic than "systematic and continuous." However, the "state interest" fac-
tor balances in favor of the assumption of jurisdiction in that W has become a
citizen of that state. Perhaps this latter factor would be given sufficient
It is on this basis that Mizner may be harmonized with Estin,11
and with Vanderbilt,"1 9 which was cited in Hanson1 20 to show that
"minimum contacts" has not obliterated all restrictions on the states'
power to assume in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defend-
ants. In Mizner, the forum state was also the state of the marital
domicile and the defendant had had all the contacts with the forum
incident to having a permanent home there. In Estin121 and Vander-
bilt,12 2 however, each respective defendant had had no contacts
whatsoever with the forum state during the marriage. Reading Miz-
ner together with Estin and Vanderbilt, the result would seem to be
that the doctrine of "divisible divorce" would be followed except
where the defendant had had sufficient contacts with the forum state
to be amenable to suit there. In such cases, both the divorce decree
and the alimony judgment would be entitled to full faith and credit.
Child Support
It would appear that alimony is not the only proceeding in the
field of domestic relations to which the rationale of Mizner could be
applied. "Minimum contacts" might be used in other in personam
domestic relations proceedings, 123 particularly child support. Analyt-
weight to carry the case. Then again, perhaps the answer would turn upon
consideration of some of the less important factors. A third possibility is that
the considerations suggested by Professor Ehrenzweig would dictate that all
close cases be decided against upholding the assumption of jurisdiction. See
note 90 supra. The author submits only that W would be well advised not to
bring her action in state B.
118 334 U.S. 541 (1947). In this case, the parties were domiciled in New
York. W brought suit in that state and was granted a separation and $180
per month permanent alimony. H then went to Nevada and was granted a
divorce there. The decree made no provision for alimony. The question pre-
sented was whether the Nevada court could cut off W's New York alimony. It
was held that it could not, since the Nevada court had obtained no jurisdiction
over W.
119 354 U.S. 416 (1957). This case presented the same fact situation as in
Estin, except that W had not reduced her claim for support to judgment prior
to the Nevada divorce. This was found not to be relevant.
120 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, (1958).
121 Estin v. Estin, 63 N.Y.S. 476, 477-78 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
122 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 153 N.Y.S.2d 1, 135 N.E.2d 553
(1956).
123 Aside from child support, which is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 124-127 infra, the other possible in personam proceeding in domestic re-
lations is child custody. However, the jurisdictional basis to award custody is
somewhat confused. CLARK § 11.5. The traditional view is that custody is a
status and that therefore only the state where the child is domiciled has juris-
diction. See 2 J. BELE, CONFLICT or LAWS § 144.3 (1935). This has been much
criticized. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees,
51 MIcH. L. REv. 345 (1953); Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across
State Lines, 10 LAw & CONTMP. PROB. 819 (1944).
Although not strictly on point, May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), indi-
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ically, child support involves the same factors 24 and jurisdictional
problems125 as alimony. Therefore, it would seem that any fact sit-
uation in which there would be sufficient "minimum contacts" for an
alimony award, there would also be sufficient "minimum contacts"
for child support.
If anything, child support presents a stronger case for applica-
tion of the "minimum contacts" test than does alimony, for two rea-
sons. First, the unique interest of a state in the maintenance and
support of domiciled children 126 might indicate that a state would have
a greater interest in providing for their economic well being than for
that of a wife. Second, the burden placed upon the defendant' due to
the trial court's continuing jurisdiction would be lighter with respect
to child support. Alimony payments may continue indefinitely, while
child support ceases upon the child attaining his majority. 2 7
cated that "a mother's right to custody of her children is a personal right en-
titled to at least as much protection as her right to alimony." Id. at 534. This
also has been much criticized. See e.g., CLARK § 11.5, at 325-26.
Disregarding both the traditional view and May, courts have adopted a
more pragmatic standard. They assume jurisdiction in child custody cases
whenever (1) the forum state has significant interest in the outcome of the
proceedings and, (2) the decree rendered will be enforceable. Id. § 11.5 at
320-21. With this in mind, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFIvCT OF LAWS
§ 79 (Proposed Official Draft, pt. I, 1967) states that:
"A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to determine the cus-
tody ... of the person of a child...
(a) who is domiciled in the state, or
(b) who is present in the state, or
(c) who is neither domiciled nor present in the state, if the controversy is
between two or more persons who are personally subject to the juris-
diction of the state.
Given the confusion present in this area, the author hesitates even to go
so far as to call child custody "in personam."
124 Assume that Mizner had involved child support rather than alimony.
It seems clear that precisely the same analytical process would be followed in
determining if the contacts of the defendant with the forum state were suffi-
cient to be considered "minimum contacts." The results of the analysis like-
wise would be the same. The defendant would be found to be amenable to
suit in California.
125 The defendant again would be an individual, and the trial court *again
would retain continuing jurisdiction to modify the award. CAL. CIV. CODE §
139.
126 "The maintenance and support of children domiciled within a state...
is a subject in which government itself is deemed to have a peculiar interest
and concern." Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 220 (1933) (Stone, J.)
(dissenting opinion).
127 "[T]he court may compel the party against whom the decree or judg-
ment is granted to make such suitable allowance for support and maintenance
of the other party for his or her life ... and also to make suitable allowance
for the support, maintenance and education of the children of said marriage
during their minority." CAL. CIV. CODE § 139. (Emphasis added).
Conclusion
As was pointed out in Mizner, "strict application of the Pennoyer
rule to family support cases has encouraged migratory divorce by of-
fering a shield to a spouse wishing to avoid financial responsibility."'2 8
This important social problem has, to date, remained unresolved.
Mizner, by applying the jurisdictional concept of "minimum contacts"
to alimony, offers a solution.129 By analogy, Mizner also offers a solu-
tion when child support rather than alimony is involved. In either
situation, a deserted spouse, or child, may acquire a personal judgment
without leaving the home state. With this judgment, the obligor may
be proceeded against wherever he may be found, without the obligee
being required to bring suit in the second state.30
This socially desirable result normally may be obtained without
violation of due process whenever the forum state is also the state of
the marital domicile. Alimony and child support involve certain
peculiarities in that the defendant is an individual and the trial court
retains continuing jurisdiction to modify the award. However, these
peculiarities do not preclude the application of the "minimum con-
tacts" test. A state's interest in seeing that decamped husbands and
fathers fulfill their responsibilities to their families must be at least
128 Mizner v. Mizner, - Nev. -, -, 439 P.2d 679, 681 (1968).
129 The result in Mizner might be arrived at by a slightly different line of
reasoning. In Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), it was held that domicile
alone is sufficient to bring a defendant who is absent from the state within
the reach of the state's personal jurisdiction. The basis for this conclusion is
that the "state which accords him [the defendant] privileges and affords pro-
tection to him ... by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal du-
ties .... One such incidence of domicile is amenability to suit within the
state even during sojourns without the state." Id. at 463. By analogy to
Milliken, it was held that a state could exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant who had been domiciled in the state at the commencement of the
action, but who had subsequently established a domicile in another state.
Allen v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 2d 306, 259 P.2d 905 (1953). It was reasoned
that the responsibilities arising out of being a domiciliary do not cease when
the domicile is ended. Id. at 312-13, 259 P.2d at 908-09. See Ehrenzweig &
Mills, Personal Service Outside the State: Pennoyer v. Neff in California, 41
CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1953); Comment, Jurisdiction and the Nomadic Resident, 5
HASTINs L.i. 191 (1954). Both discuss Allen.
The extension of this line of reasoning to Mizner, where the defendant had
been a domiciliary of the forum state at the time the cause of action arose, is
apparent. The defendant would not free himself from the already existing
marital responsibilities merely by establishing a domicile elsewhere.
130 The obligee may make use of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act. This, or its equivalent, is in force in all 50 states, all territories and the
District of Columbia. 9C UNIFoRm LAWs AN. 9-10 (Supp. 1967). In Cali-
fornia, this codified as Code of Civil Procedure sections 1650-1699. The es-
sence of this procedure is that the obligee brings an action on the judgment in
his own state and the case is from thence transferred to, and tried in the state
where the obligor can be found. 9C UNiFoRm LAws AN. 5 (1957) (a more
detailed description of the steps involved is given there).
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as great as its interest in holding out-of-state corporations to their
contractual and tortious obligations. "Traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" dictate that a state be able to exercise extra-
territorial jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in order to see
this interest fulfilled.
J Eric F. Sweet*
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